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Abstract
Regulators appointed on ﬁnite contracts have an incentive to signal their worth
to the job market. This paper shows that, if contracts are suﬃciently short, this
can result in “minimal squawk” behaviour. Regulated ﬁrms publicise the quality
of unfavourable decisions, aware that regulators then set favourable policies more
often to keep their professional reputation intact. Terms of oﬃce vary across US
states, prompting an empirical test using ﬁrm-level data from the regulation of the
US electric industry. Consistent with the theory, we ﬁnd that shorter terms are
associated with fewer rate of return reviews and higher residential prices.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C23, C25, D73, J45.
Keywords: bureaucratic behaviour, career concerns, capture, binary choice models
with panel data.
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1. Introduction
Noting that regulators’ terms of oﬃce were limited, but generally longer than those of
the politicians that appointed them, Hilton (1972) suggested that the organisation of
the US regulatory profession was unlikely to encourage best practice. The probability of
re-appointment could not be evaluated very highly, while employment in the regulated
industry was an obvious alternative. As a result, regulators were likely to set policy with
an eye on the job market: pacifying regulated ﬁrms to maintain a favourable reputation
and hence secure future employment. In short, Hilton conjectured that ﬁnite contracts
resulted in “minimal squawk” behaviour.
Today, 30 years later, this issue is as salient as ever. First, ﬁnite contracts remain
commonplace in regulatory agencies. In the US, every state that appoints its public
utility commissioners does so for a term of between 5 and 8 years. Similarly, in the UK,
the Director General of every independent body created to regulate the newly privatised
entities has been appointed for a ﬁxed term of 5 years or less. Second, the common
justiﬁcation given for the use of such contracts is that they are necessary to limit collusion
between ﬁrms and their regulators, otherwise known as regulatory capture.1 Accordingly,
this paper revisits Hilton’s conjecture, asking if the use of ﬁnite contracts might simply
be replacing one source of political failure with another.
In doing so we develop a theoretical model of, as well as an empirical test for,
“minimal squawk” behaviour in the context of utility regulation. Over the last 30 years,
however, legislation has largely closed the revolving door between regulatory oﬃce and
industry job.2 Meanwhile, increasing media exposure has ensured that regulators pay
attention to the reputation their policies earn them in wider, non-industry circles in the
hope of securing desirable future employment.3 We therefore ask if career concerns in
general, rather than prospects of future industry employment, might prompt regulators
to pacify their regulatees.
Our theoretical model focuses on the following setting. A regulator is appointed
1Replacing the post of Director General of the National Lottery with a National Lottery Commission,
where the post of chairperson would be held for just 12 months, the UK government claimed ‘its intro-
duction will reduce the risk, actual or perceived, of conﬂicts of interest and regulatory capture’. Taken
from Hansard Written Answers, 1st April 1998, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationary-
oﬃce.co.uk.
2In the UK former public servants must seek clearance before joining private companies for two
years after leaving oﬃce. See the reports of The Committee for Standards in Public Life, availiable
at http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/. The annual reports published by the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners list similar restrictions for the US.
3For instance, Phillips (1988) notes that in the 1970’s ‘the media, after years of neglect, began to
cover utility hearings, often giving them top coverage’, pp. 13. Similarly, Anderson (1980) remarks that
‘regulators, who a few years before had enjoyed the relative obscurity of technical debates...now saw
those same debates recast in emotional terms before a wide audience’, pp. 24.
2for a ﬁxed term to regulate a ﬁrm facing a cost state that is either ‘low’ or ‘high’. The
regulator can either set a policy that is ‘tough’ or one that is ‘generous’. Only ‘tough’
when costs are ‘low’ and ‘generous’ when costs are ‘high’ are considered to be good
regulatory decisions. Regulators are either ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’, where smart regulators
receive a more informative private signal of the true cost state. Ex ante both types seek
to make good decisions but, since ability is valued by the job-market, there is also an
incentive to send a positive signal to future employers. Observing the cost state, the
ﬁrm ﬁnds it is uniquely placed to reveal the quality of the regulator’s decision-making.
It therefore seeks to ensure that the regulator is ‘generous’ by squawking -i . e . b y
strategically divulging the quality of the regulator’s decision-making to the job market.
This simple model shows that regulatory career concerns may indeed result in so-
cially undesirable policies. To see why suppose that the ﬁrm squawks when the regulator
is ‘tough’ but stays silent when she is ‘generous’. Smart regulators relish the opportunity
to demonstrate their superior decision-making skills. However, dumb regulators recog-
nise ‘tough’ policies expose their poor decision-making to the market’s scrutiny. Dumb
regulators therefore have an incentive to hide behind ‘generous’ policies to ensure that
their professional reputation remains intact.
Of course, if the market thinks dumb regulators are always ‘generous’ it will simply
treat ‘tough’ policies as evidence that the regulator is smart. (But then dumb regulators
have an incentive to be ‘tough’). Accordingly, we establish that the regulator will strike
a balance between these two eﬀects. Formally, when career concerns are suﬃciently
important, a hybrid sub-game equilibrium exists in which smart regulators try to make
good decisions but dumb regulators mix between attempting to make good decisions and
simply being ‘generous’. Moreover, given dumb regulators hide behind tough policies
when the ﬁrm squawks on generous, but attempt to make good decisions when the ﬁrm
always squawks or always stays silent, this constitutes an equilibrium of the whole game.
The ﬁrm optimally squawks only on ‘tough’ policies, aware that ‘generous’ policies will
then be set in all cost states with positive probability.
Performing comparative statics we ﬁnd that “minimal squawk” behaviour (i.e.
the probability with which dumb regulators set ‘generous’ policies) is increasing in the
strength of career concerns. Given the length of a regulator’s appointment term is a nat-
ural (exogenous) indicator of the strength of her career concerns, we test this model by
exploiting variation in terms of oﬃce across US state public utility commissions (PUCs).
Speciﬁcally, we equate ‘generous’ policies with failing to initiate a rate review and ‘low’
cost signals with a fall in lagged operating expenses (hereafter ∆opex), allowing us to
formulate three testable hypotheses: rate reviews should be more likely the longer PUC
terms of oﬃce; rate reviews should be more likely the higher ∆opex;a n dﬁnally the eﬀect
of term length should be greater when ∆opex is negative rather than positive.
Estimating Logit and Conditional (Fixed Eﬀects) Logit models of the probability
that a ﬁrm faces a rate review using ﬁrm-level panel data from the regulation of the
US electric industry, we ﬁnd evidence in favour of all three hypotheses. We therefore
conclude that short regulatory appointments may not be the panacea that some have
hoped for. Rather, in appointing their regulators on ever shorter contracts, governments
3may indeed be replacing one source of regulatory capture with another.
Politicians typically observe the realisation, but not the quality, of bureaucratic
decision-making. Moreover, such information often lies with the recipients of their de-
cisions. Our results therefore have implications for wider bureaucratic behaviour. If
bureaucrats care about their decision-making reputation, their ‘consumers’ have an in-
centive to reveal the quality of some, but crucially not all, decisions; not because decisions
can then be over-turned, but rather because this preempts “minimal squawk” behaviour.
In this sense our paper echoes Prendergast’s (2000) claim that the nature of bureaucratic
goods ensures bureaucrats accede to consumer demands to avoid ‘complaints’. In both
papers bureaucracies are, by deﬁnition, ineﬃcient.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical model, characterises all equilibria and performs comparative statics. Section
3 outlines the empirical hypotheses that follow from the theory and econometric models
used to test them. Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Formal proofs, where necessary, are given in an appendix together with a full description
of all data sources.
2. Theory
2.1. The Model
Description A legislator seeks to regulate a ﬁrm which has private information over
an exogenous cost parameter. For simplicity, we assume this cost state is either ‘low’
or ‘high’, denoted ω ∈ {l,h}, and restrict attention to policies that are either ‘tough’ or
‘generous’, denoted k ∈ {t,g}. The four possible regulatory outcomes are shown in the
table below.







The applicability of such a set up to rate of return regulation is discussed in Section 3.1
and, for now, we simply assume it is common knowledge that (l,t)a n d( h,g)a r egood
decisions and (h,t)a n d( l,g)a r ebad decisions.
The legislator retains the common prior Pr(ω = l)=P r ( ω = h)=
1
2 but knows
specialist regulators can conduct experiments which generate informative cost signals,
denoted s ∈ {l,h} where Pr(s = ω | ω) >
1
2. The accuracy of a regulator’s cost signal is
private information and is determined by her innate ability to process information. For
simplicity, we assume regulators are either ‘smart’ S or ‘dumb’ D, where smart regulators
receive more accurate signals than dumb regulators in the sense that Pr(s = ω | ω,θS)=
4θS > Pr(s = ω | ω,θD)=θD and, for convenience, θi < 1 ∀i = S,D.4 In an attempt
to improve social welfare, the legislator therefore delegates regulatory decision-making
t oar e g u l a t o rf o raﬁxed period y. We assume this regulator is drawn from a pool that
contains an equal proportion of each type and thus, while the regulator knows her type,
all other interested parties share the prior Pr(θS)=P r ( θD)=1
2.
The appointed regulator derives utility from two sources: directly from her policy
choice, which we term her policy preferences, as well as from the eﬀe c tt h a ts u c hd e c i s i o n s
have on her future job prospects, which we term her career concerns. For reasons given
below, we assume both types derive utility Hr from making a good decision and hence
denote the regulator’s policy preferences by u(l,t)=u(h,g)=Hr >u (l,g)=u(h,t)=0 ,
where u(ω,k) denotes her pay-oﬀ to choosing price cap k in cost state ω.
All future private sector employers - with the exception of the regulated ﬁrm which
is forbidden from employing the regulator - are subsumed into a single player called
‘the market’. We assume decision-making ability is relevant in the private sector and,
moreover, that the market oﬀers the regulator a wage equal to its posterior beliefs µ
over θi at information sets determined by the regulator’s equilibrium choice of k and any
action taken by the regulated ﬁrm. Note that the market’s beliefs therefore completely
characterise its actions and hence regulatory career concerns. We restrict attention to a
single policy choice k and wage oﬀer µ, introducing dynamic considerations by weighting
the utility that the regulator receives from her future wage by the term δ(y), where
dδ/dy < 0. Adopting a simple additive speciﬁcation, the regulator’s objective function
is therefore denoted by U = u(ω,k)+δµ.
The ﬁrm (weakly) prefers ‘generous’ policies in all cost states and hence its direct
pay-oﬀsa r eg i v e nb yv(l,g)=Hf >v (h,g)=v(l,t)=Lf >v (h,t)=0 , where v(ω,k)
denotes the ﬁrm’s utility when the regulator chooses k in cost state ω. To enable us to
focus on alternative sources of regulatory capture, the ﬁrm is forbidden from oﬀering
direct transfers or policy relevant information. It is aware, however, that the market
will use Bayes’s Rule and the regulator’s strategy to update µ when it observes ω. The
ﬁrm therefore seeks to inﬂuence k indirectly by squawking. That is, it publicly commits
to a disclosure rule which states when it will stay silent and when it will reveal cost
information to the market. We assume such revelation is costless and that, following
any regulatory decision, the ﬁrm has just two possible actions: silence or reveal ω. We
denote these actions by a ∈ {∅,ω} and the ﬁrm’s strategy by d ∈ D,w h e r eD denotes
the set of possible disclosure rules deﬁned by these two actions and the four outcomes
given in Table 1.
Formally, the model contains four possible types of regulator: a smart regulator that
receives a low signal, a smart regulator that receives a high signal and so on. However,
in order to focus on whether career concerns induce each ability type to attempt to
make good decisions, we adopt the following convention. Let σi =( pi,q i) denote the
probability that a regulator with ability θi sets t,w h e r epi denotes the probability that
she sets t when s = l, qi the probability that she sets t when s = h and i = S,D as
4The imposition of the upper bound implies incorrect signals are received with positive probability,
thereby reducing the number of occasions on which information sets are oﬀ the equilibrium path.
5before. We may now deﬁne four pure strategies for any i = S,D and d ∈ D:
i) ‘follow’: σi =( 1,0),tif s = l and g if s = h.
ii) ‘contradict’: σi =( 0 ,1), g if s = l and t if s = h.
iii) ‘always tough’: σi =( 1,1),t∀s = l,h.
iv) ‘always generous’: σi =( 0 ,0), g ∀s = l,h.
Note playing ‘follow’ is analogous with attempting to make good decisions. Moreover,
in the ﬁrst two cases the regulator uses the information content of her signal, while in
the latter two cases she ignores it.
In light of the above, an equilibrium strategy for a regulator with ability θi, σo
i,5 is
deﬁned by the solution to
max
pi,qi E[Ui]=E[u(ω,k)+δµ(d,k,a) | s,θi,p i,q i], (1)
where the expectations operator reﬂects her uncertainty over ω. While an equilibrium




where the expectations operator reﬂects its uncertainty over the regulator’s ability θi.
It should now be clear that this dynamic game of incomplete information has three
stages. In the ﬁrst stage the ﬁrm chooses a disclosure rule d ∈ D to induce a sub-
game between the regulator and market. Within this sub-game the regulator moves ﬁrst
choosing k ∈ {t,g}. Given the cost state ω, this choice of k induces an action a ∈ {∅,ω}
as stipulated by the disclosure rule d. The market has the ﬁnal move oﬀering the regulator
a wage equal to its expectation of the regulator’s talent conditional on d,k and a.
The solution concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). As Lizzeri
(1999) notes, the fact that the disclosure rule is observable implies that a PBE for such
a game is a list of PBE in every sub-game induced by each d ∈ D together with the
requirement that d solves (2). Since the market’s action is completely characterised by
its beliefs we solve for such a PBE by backwards induction.
Discussion of Assumptions Several of the above assumptions warrant further dis-
cussion. To enable us to pin down equilibria in the event that the market pays the same
wage for any policy choice, we assume the regulator derives utility from making good
decisions. As a possible justiﬁcation suppose the legislator oﬀers the regulator a wage
contract contingent on information revealed later in the game. Providing the regulator
has limited liability, one would expect the optimal scheme to pay a bonus if she is shown
to have made a good decision. Alternatively, one could take a more traditional view and
assume that regulators attach some weight to maximising social welfare.
5Throughout the superscript o is used to denote an equilibrium value.
6We restrict attention to single ‘on the job’ and ‘post-agency’ periods, incorporating
dynamic considerations by weighting the regulator’s future wage with a factor that is de-
creasing in the length of appointment term. This modelling choice captures the intuitive
notion that career concerns should play a greater role in determining policy choices in
regimes where regulators are appointed for shorter periods of time. Moreover, it permits
simple comparative statics which can then be taken to the data.
Finally, we assume that the ﬁrm cannot lie to the market about its cost realisation
thereby greatly reducing its strategy space. While this assumption suggests that it may
be possible to ﬁnd a contractual solution to this regulatory problem, we abstract from
the possibility of mechanism design. In doing so our aim is to draw attention to the fact
that common place regulatory institutions, such as short appointments and price caps
or rate reviews, may actually foster alternative sources of regulatory capture.
2.2. The Policy Selection Sub-Game
We deﬁne a PBE of any sub-game between the regulator and the market induced by the
ﬁrm’s choice of disclosure rule d as a pair of strategy functions σo
S,σo
D and a set of beliefs
µo such that: i) at information sets on the equilibrium path these beliefs are derived via
Bayes’s’ Rule from the ﬁrm’s choice of disclosure rule d and the regulator’s strategy and
ii) σo
S and σo
D solve (1) given µo. Given our aim is to highlight that career concerns may
result in ineﬃcient decision-making, we assume it is common knowledge that the market
retains its prior beliefs at information sets oﬀ the equilibrium path.6 W er e f e rt oaP B E
of any sub-game that satisﬁes this restriction simply as a ‘sub-game equilibrium’.
In attempting to establish all possible sub-game equilibria we exploit the fact that
D may be partioned into four generic classes of disclosure rule - ‘no disclosure’, ‘silent
on tough’, ‘silent on generous’ and ‘full disclosure’ - according to the information sets
that each rule induces. Since sub-games in which the market has the same information
sets share equilibria, this enables us to restrict our analysis to each class of disclosure
rule rather than every d ∈ D.7
No disclosure Under a policy of ‘no disclosure’ the market simply learns that the
regulator chose t or g. Let e σi =( e pi, e qi) denote the strategy function that the market
believes the regulator is playing. Given Pr(ω = l)=P r ( ω = h)=
1
2, the Total Proba-
bility Rule implies Pr(s = l)=P r ( s = h)=
1
2. The market may therefore deduce from
e σi that Pr(t | θi, e σi)=
1
2(e pi + e qi) and Pr(g | θi, e σi)=
1
2(2 − e pi − e qi). Moreover, given
6Che (1995) adopts an analogous approach, assuming that “the regulator’s out-of-equilibrium mon-
itoring performance is signal free; i.e., the ﬁrm does not update its beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path”,
p. 386. In making this assumption we remove the possibility that both S and D ignore their signals.
Given such equilibria are a possibility under any disclosure rule this does not change the essence of our
results.
7Take the example of ‘silent on tough’ and suppose the market is aware that the ﬁrm will reveal ω
on, say, (h,g) but not (l,g). If k = g then ∅ is as informative as ω,while if k = t, ∅ contains no new
information. Thus under any disclosure rule that is ‘silent on tough’ the market’s information sets are
{l;h;θS;θD;t}, {l;θS;θD;g} and {h;θS;θD;g}.
7Pr(θS)=P r ( θD)=1
2, Bayes’ Rule implies that the market’s posterior belief that the
regulator is smart is given by
µ(t)=
Pr(t | θS, e σS) · Pr(θS)
Pr(t | θS, e σS) · Pr(θS)+P r ( t | θD, e σD) · Pr(θD)
=
e pS + e qS
e pS + e qS + e pD + e qD
(3)
at the information set following a choice of t and
µ(g)=
2 − e pS − e qS
4 − e pS − e qS − e pD − e qD
(4)
following a choice of g.
To verify whether e σi is indeed an equilibrium strategy ∀i = S,D we must establish
the probability with which a regulator with ability θi will expect to receive Hr, µ(t) and
µ(g). Clearly, given σi =( pi,q i), she will expect to receive µ(t) with Pr(t | θi,σi)=
1
2(pi + qi) and µ(g) with Pr(g | θi,σi)=
1
2(2 − pi − qi). However, to establish the
probability with which she will expect to receive Hr we must ﬁrst derive Pr(l,t | θi,σi)
and Pr(h,g | θi,σi). Note that Bayes’ Rule implies Pr(ω = s | s,θi)=θi. Thus, upon
receipt of s = l, the regulator may deduce that Pr(l,t | l,θi,σi)=piθi -i . e . t h e
probability that she sets k = t when s = l given σi(pi,q i) times the probability that her
signal was correct. Similarly she may deduce that Pr(h,g | l,θi,σi)=( 1 − pi)(1 − θi).
Alternatively, if she receives s = h she may deduce that Pr(l,t | h,θi,σi)=qi(1 − θi)
and that Pr(h,g | h,θi,σi)=( 1 − qi)θi. Therefore, given Pr(s = l)=1
2,t h er e g u l a t o r
will expect to make a good decision with probability
Pr(l,t | θi,σi)+P r ( h,g | θi,σi)=1
2 (1 + pi(2θi − 1)+qi(1 − 2θi)).
When the ﬁrm plays ‘no disclosure’ we may therefore restate our deﬁnition of σo
i









2(2 − pi − qi)µ(g)]
i
. (5)
Solving (5) for every set of beliefs deﬁned by (3) and (4) yields our ﬁrst preliminary
result:
Lemma 1. When the regulated ﬁrm adopts a policy of ‘no disclosure’, for any δ, there
exists a unique ‘follow’ pooling sub-game equilibrium in which σo
i =( 1,0) ∀i = S,D.8
Given the market never observes the quality of regulatory decision-making, D can
mimic any favourable action. Pooling behaviour is therefore the only possibility. If the
market thinks both types use their signals it will believe that they are equally likely to
set t (and hence by deﬁnition equally likely to set g) and will therefore pay the same wage
8The market’s equilibrium beliefs, together with a formal proof, may be found in the appendix.
8following both t and g. However, given the market retain its priors at information sets
oﬀ the equilibrium path, the market also pays the same wage for both t and g when both
types ignore their signals. Career concerns are therefore irrelevant under any strategy
and thus both S and D seek to further their policy preferences by attempting to make
good decisions.
Silence on tough Under a policy of ‘silent on tough’ the market learns either that
the regulator chose t, t h a ts h em a d et h eb a dd e c i s i o n( l,g) or that she made the good
decision (h,g). Following the procedure outlined above (i.e. establishing the market’s
beliefs µ(t),µ (l,g) and µ(h,g) via Bayes’s Rule, restating our deﬁnition of σo
i and solving
for every set of beliefs deﬁned by σi(pi,q i)), we establish our second preliminary result:
Lemma 2. When the regulated ﬁrm adopts a disclosure rule that is ‘silent on tough’
there exist δf, qD, δc,p
D and pD such that:9
i) iﬀ δ ≤ δf then there exists a ‘follow’ pooling sub-game equilibrium with σo
i =
(1,0) ∀i = S,D;
ii) iﬀ δ > δf then there exists a ‘follow, always tough’ hybrid sub-game equilibrium
with σo
S =( 1,0) and σo
D =( 1,q D), for some qD(θS,θD,H r,δ) ∈ (0,qD);
iii) iﬀ δ ≥ δc then there exists a ‘contradict, always tough’ hybrid sub-game equilibrium
with σo
S =( 0 ,1) and σo
D =( pD,1), for some pD(θS,θD,H r,δ) ∈ (p
D,pD].
No other sub-game equilibria exist for any δ.
The market now observes the quality of the regulator’s decision if she sets g. If S
ignores her signals, as above, D will mimic favourable actions when the market thinks
she plays a separating strategy, while career concerns are again irrelevant under a pooling
strategy. The story changes, however, if S elects to use her signals.
Suppose the market thinks both S and D attempt to make good decisions. Bayes’s
rule implies that - independent of the cost and ability state - the regulator is as likely
to receive s = l as s = h. The market therefore expects to observe t as often as g.B y
Bayes’s rule, the market must therefore deduce that the regulator is as likely to be smart
following t as g -i . e .µ(g)=µ(t).H o w e v e r ,t h eﬁrm reveals its true costs if (but only if)
the regulator sets g and thus the market actually observes either t, (l,g), (h,g). Given
the regulator’s strategy, the market expects S (D) to make the good decision (h,g)w i t h
probability θS (θD) and the bad decision with the converse probability. Thus, by Bayes’s
rule, the market must deduce that the regulator is more likely to be smart following
(h,g)t h a n( l,g)-i . e .µ(h,g) >µ (l,g).
The ﬁrm’s decision to stay silent on ‘tough’ eﬀectively splits the wage oﬀer µ(g) into
ar e w a r df o rm a k i n gag o o dd e c i s i o na n dap u n i s h m e n tf o rm a k i n gab a dd e c i s i o n .S i n c e
9For a deﬁnition of δf and qD see the formal proof of Lemma 2 in the appendix. Deﬁnitions of δc,
p
D and pD can be established in a similar manner.
9the market does not observe the appointed regulator’s ability it expects to see a good
decision with probability
1
2(θS +θD) and a bad decision with probability
1
2(2−θS −θD).





2(2 − θS − θD)µ(l,g).
Now put yourself in the shoes of the regulator. Since ability is private information,
S knows for sure that she is an above average decision-maker. Thus, upon receipt of
s = h, she is aware that if she sets g she will make the good decision (h,g)w i t hh i g h e r
probability than the market expected and, likewise, the bad decision (l,g)w i t hl o w e r
probability than the market expected. Setting g upon receipt of s = h therefore yields
her a higher expected wage than setting t. In contrast, D knows that she is a below
average decision-maker. She therefore ﬁnds that setting t upon receipt of s = h yields
her the higher expected wage. Consequently, if career concerns are suﬃciently important,
D deviates from attempting to making good decisions.
Now suppose that the market thinks that S attempts to make a good decision
but D plays ‘always tough’. Since D never sets g the market can be certain that the
regulator is smart following either (h,g)o r( l,g). But, given these new wage oﬀers, D
ﬁnds that setting g upon receipt of s = h now yields a higher expected wage than setting
t. Accordingly, D deviates from playing ‘always tough’.
Alternatively, then, suppose the market thinks that D plays a mixed strategy,
setting t with positive, but not certain, probability. The more likely the market thinks
D is to set t, the lower the wage it oﬀers after such an observation and the higher the
wage it oﬀers after observing either (h,g)o r( l,g); i.e. the lower her incentive to set t
upon receipt of s = h actually becomes. Eventually the market’s beliefs will be such
that D’s career concern incentive to set t exactly oﬀsets her policy preference to set g.
At this point she will indeed be willing to mix and hence such an equilibrium exists.
In essence, when career concerns are suﬃciently important, decision-making ability
acts as a sorting mechanism: if able regulators use their signals, less able regulators have
a career concern incentive to ignore their signals to keep their professional reputation
intact. Since regulators can also use their signals to increase the probability of bad
decisions, analogous logic supports the possibility of ‘mirror’ equilibria.
Silence on generous Under a policy of ‘silent on generous’ the market learns either
that the regulator made the good decision (l,t), that she made the bad decision bad
(h,t) or that she chose g. Following the procedure outlined above, we establish our third
preliminary result:
Lemma 3. When the regulated ﬁrm adopts a disclosure rule that is ‘silent on generous’
there exist δf, δc,p
D,q
D and qD such that:10
i) iﬀ δ ≤ δf then there exists a ‘follow’ pooling sub-game equilibrium with σo
i =
(1,0) ∀i = S,D;
10p
D, q
D and qD can be derived in a similar manner to their counterparts in Lemma 2.
10ii) iﬀ δ > δf then there exists a ‘follow, always generous’ hybrid sub-game equilibrium
with σo
S =( 1,0) and σo
D =( pD,0), for some pD(θ1,θ2,H r,δ) ∈ (p
D,1);
iii) iﬀ δ ≥ δc then there exists a ‘contradict, always generous’ hybrid sub-game equi-
librium with σo
S =( 0 ,1), σo
D =( 0 ,q D), for some qD(θ1,θ2,H r,δ) ∈ [q
D,qD).
No other sub-game equilibria exist for any δ.
The intuition here is exactly analogous to Lemma 2. If career concerns are weighted
suﬃciently highly, D sets g (rather than t) more often in an attempt to protect her
professional reputation.
Full Disclosure Finally, under a policy of ‘full disclosure’ the market always learns
the quality of the regulator’s decision-making. Again, following the same procedure as
above, we establish our ﬁnal preliminary result:11
Lemma 4. When the regulated ﬁrm adopts a policy of ‘full disclosure’ there exists δm
such that:12
i) for any δ there exists a ‘follow’ pooling sub-game equilibrium with σo
i =( 1,0) ∀i =
S,D;
ii) iﬀ δ > δm then there exists a ‘contradict’ pooling sub-game equilibrium with σo
i =
(0,1) ∀i = S,D.
No other sub-game equilibria exist for any δ.
The market now observes the quality of the regulator’s decision regardless of
whether she sets t or g. Suppose D receives the signal s = l. If she sets g she will
make the good decision (h,g) with lower probability than the bad decision (l,g)a n d
hence she is better oﬀ setting t. In short, if S uses her signals to make good (bad) deci-
sions, D will follow suit since the market treats bad (good) decision-making as evidence
of low ability.
2.3. The Firm’s Choice of Disclosure Rule
Having established a list of sub-game equilibria for every d ∈ D,a l lt h a tr e m a i n si s
to solve for the optimal disclosure rule do. In the following empirical analysis we ab-
stract from the possibility that smart regulators attempt to signal their ability via bad
decision-making (i.e. we ignore the possibility of mirror equilibria). It is easy to show
that, for given δ, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between equilibria within each sub-game. For
11As we discuss below, Levy (2000) studies a similar setting. This result extends, albeit for two types,
her benchmark results by allowing for the possibility of ‘asymmetric strategies’. See Levy (2000) pp.
6-7.
12δm can be derived in a similar manner to δf.
11convenience, then, our remaining results are stated allowing only for the possibility that
smart regulators attempt to make good decisions.













Given the above restriction, solving (6) yields:
Proposition 1. I nt h eg a m ed e ﬁned by {D, σ,µ ,U ,v }:
i) if δ ≤ δf the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between disclosure rules (i.e. do ∈ D) since S and
D always attempt to make good decisions.
ii) if δ > δf the ﬁrm is ‘silent on generous’ since this ensures D sets generous policies
in all cost states with positive probability.
If the ﬁrm expects both S and D to play ‘follow’ then E[v(ω,k) | s = l]=θiLf
and E[v(ω,k) | s = h]=( 1 − θi)Hf + θiLf. Without loss of generality let Lf = 1
2Hf.
The ﬁrm’s expected pay-oﬀ under the ‘follow’ pooling equilibrium therefore simpliﬁes to
Lf.S i n c et h eﬁrm holds the common priors Pr(θS)=P r ( θD)=
1
2, the ﬁrm’s expected
pay-oﬀ were S to play ‘follow’ and D to play ‘always tough’ would be
3
4Lf. Thus, given
D’s strategy in the ‘follow, always tough’ hybrid equilibrium is a convex combination of
‘follow’ and ‘always tough’ the ﬁrm’s pay-oﬀ must lie between Lf and 3
4Lf. Analogously,
under the ‘follow, always generous’ hybrid equilibrium the ﬁrm’s pay-oﬀ must lie between
Lf and
3
2Lf. Proposition 1 then follows immediately from Lemmas 1 - 4 and comparison
of these pay-oﬀs.
From Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 it is now easy to establish the (ex ante)p r o b a -
bility that an appointed regulator will make a good regulatory decision.
Corollary 1.
i) If δ ≤ δf then σo
i =( 1,0) ∀i = S,D and thus Pr(good decision)=
1
2(θS + θD);
ii) if δ > δf then σo
S =( 1,0) and σo
D =( po










Providing career concerns are suﬃciently unimportant, both S and D attempt to
make good decisions. The ex ante probability of a good decision is therefore simply
the average of their decision-making ability. Thus, since the legislature can only make
good decisions with probability
1
2 < θi ∀i = S,D, delegating regulatory decision-making
achieves the second best. However, if δ > δf,Sattempts to make good decisions but
D mixes between ‘follow’ and ‘always generous’. Recall po
D denotes the probability with
which D sets t when s = l. The lower po
D, the more often D plays ‘always generous’
and thus the closer she is to making good decisions with the same probability as the
legislator. Delegation therefore oﬀers a Pareto improvement but not the second best.
122.4. Comparative Statics
Proposition 2.
i) S plays ‘follow’ ∀δ;
ii) the probability with which D plays ‘always generous’ (i.e. 1 − po
D)i s( w e a k l y )
increasing in δ;
iii) the level of δ necessary to induce D to set g with any given probability is increasing
in Hr and θD but is decreasing in θS.
Aware that she is an above average decision-maker, S attempts to make good
decisions irrespective of the strength of her career concerns. In contrast, as δ increases
above δf, the below average decision-maker, D, has a stronger career concern incentive
to set g when s = l. The market must therefore believe that D sets g with higher
probability since this decreases her career concern incentive to play ‘always generous’,
thereby ensuring that she will continue to mix.
As Hr increases, D has a stronger policy preference incentive to set t when s = l,
implying the level of δ necessary to exactly oﬀset this eﬀect - and hence induce her to mix
- must also increase. On the other hand, as θS increases S is more likely to make good
decisions when following her signals. Given the market will take a good (bad) decision
to be stronger (weaker) evidence that the regulator is smart, D therefore has a stronger
career concern incentive to set g when s = l. Accordingly, the level of δ necessary to
induce her to mix decreases with θS.
An increase in θD has two separate eﬀects. First, D is more likely to make good
decisions when following her signals, implying that the market will take a good (bad)
decision to be weaker (stronger) evidence that the regulator is smart. Accordingly, D
has a weaker career concern incentive to set g when s = l. Second, given D makes a good
decision with higher probability when she follows her signals, she also has a stronger
policy preference incentive to set t when s = l. These two eﬀects combine to ensure that
the level of δ necessary to induce her to mix is increasing in θD.
2.5. Related Literature
Our ﬁnding that regulatory career concerns foster sub-optimal decision-making is driven
by two factors: ﬁrst, that ability is private information and second that the information
structure - i.e. the market’s ability to update over ability - lies with a strategic player.
In this section we brieﬂy outline how these assumptions relate our theoretical results to
others in the literature.
To date, only Le Borgne and Lockwood (2000) have studied the eﬀect of public
sector career concerns when ability is private information.13 In contrast to our approach,
13Papers that study public sector career concerns under symmetric information include Dewatripont
et al (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chp. 4), who build on Holmström’s (1982, 1999) seminal
model of managerial career concerns.
13however, they focus on a setting in which a politician can exert costly eﬀort in an
attempt to convince the electorate of her ability to add to future physical productivity.
Interestingly, under their set up, career concerns ensure all types increase eﬀort levels.
Both Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Levy (2000) examine how managers mo-
tivated by reputational concerns resolve decisions under uncertainty. In these papers,
however, the market observes the quality of all managerial decisions. Focusing on se-
quential decision-making under symmetric information, Scharfstein and Stein show that
managers may ignore their substantive private information and simply mimic earlier de-
cisions - a phenomenon they describe as ‘herd behaviour’. In contrast, Levy (2000) shows
that, when ability is private information, career concerns can result in ‘anti-herding’; i.e.
in the benchmark case all types attempt to make good decisions but, given the oppor-
tunity to seek advice, decision-makers can signal by claiming to be better sources of
information. In endogenising the market’s ability to update, our paper therefore high-
lights an alternative reason why career concerns may prompt decision-makers to ignore
informative signals.
Prendergast (2000) focuses on a setting in which an evaluator can observe the
quality of some, but not all, bureaucratic decisions and ﬁnds, as we do, that such an
information structure prompts bureaucrats to minimise the probability of ‘complaints’
rather than to pursue optimal policies. In this paper, however, we provide a micro-
foundation for such behaviour by introducing a formal model of bureaucratic career
concerns. Moreover, we show that such asymmetry can be derived endogenously by
modelling the recipients of bureaucratic decisions as formal players in the game.
In doing so, we also oﬀer an insight into political inﬂuence seeking. Epstein and
O’Halloran (1995) suggest that regulatory agencies may silence an interest group to
limit the possibility of congressional veto. Our paper therefore demonstrates that career
concerns, as well as policy preferences, may oﬀer bureaucrats an incentive to silence
possible critics. Dal Bó and Di Tella (2000) present a reduced form model of capture
by ‘threat’. Our paper could therefore be seen as a micro-founded model of precisely
how interest groups can (perfectly legally) threaten policy-makers into concessions by
exploiting their concerns for a future career.
3. Empirical Framework
In the US, responsibility for intra-state regulation lies with state public utility com-
missions (PUCs). PUCs were formed over a period of 125 years and hence regulatory
institutions diﬀer markedly from state to state. In particular, states have established
very diﬀerent terms of oﬃce for PUC commissioners.14 Given statutory terms of oﬃce
are an obvious exogenous indicator of the strength of career concerns (i.e. δ), a natural
way to test the above model is therefore to compare regulatory outcomes across state
PUCs.
14For example, in 1982 commissioners in Pennsylvania were to serve for 10 years but commissioners
in the District of Columbia for just 3 years, while in 1985 Pennsylvannia halved its term of oﬃce to just
5 years. Source: NARUC yearbooks (see appendix for details).
143.1. “Minimal squawk” under Rate Regulation
Oﬀering his own slant on the “minimal squawk” hypothesis, Joskow (1974) suggests
that regulatory agencies seek to minimise conﬂict and therefore “do nothing” if none of
the actors in the regulatory process are complaining. Consequently, he conjectures that
formal rate of return reviews will be triggered by ﬁrms attempting to raise the level of
their rates and hence that
‘during periods of falling average cost, we should expect to observe virtually no
regulatory rate of return reviews’.15
While lacking a micro-foundation for why regulators might seek to minimise conﬂict,
Joskow therefore highlights that, if it exists, “minimal squawk” behaviour should be
reﬂected in the relationship between cost conditions and the incidence of formal rate
reviews.
To see that we can exploit this prediction to test our theoretical model, it is helpful
to outline the basic features of the rate of return framework. As Phillips (1988) notes,
rate regulation has two aspects: regulation of the rate level (earnings) and control of the
rate structure (prices). Regulation of the rate level can be summarised by the formula
R = O + Ar. That is, public utilities are entitled to earn a level of revenue R, suﬃcient
to cover allowable operating costs O and earn a “fair” rate of return r on the asset base
A. Crucially, given the context of this paper, either the ﬁrm or the PUC can ﬁle for a
rate review if R proves too tight or too loose. Following such a request, the PUC will
typically suspend the proposal for a set period, while the ﬁrm (with the PUC’s consent)
proposes a ‘test year’ to enable the PUC to determine O and hence ascertain an estimate
for R. At this point the case is set down on the PUC’s docket and the ﬁrm, PUC and /
or any intervenors preﬁle ‘canned’ testimony. When the case is called an administrative
law judge makes a recommended decision which is subject to appeal by the PUC or ﬁrm.
It should therefore be clear that this system gives ﬁrms both the motive and oppor-
tunity to ﬁle for a rate review to increase R when input costs are rising, but an incentive
to stay silent when they are falling. Given initiating a review expends PUC resources, it
is eﬃcient for regulators to restrict attention to the possibility that input costs are falling
or constant (‘low’ and ‘high’ cost signals respectively) and to contemplate either ﬁling
for a review to decrease R or to simply do nothing (‘tough’ or ‘generous’ respectively).
Thus, since it is socially sub-optimal for the ﬁrm to be granted a revenue requirement
that more than covers O, ‘ﬁle’ when costs are falling and ‘do nothing’ when costs are
constant represent the only ‘good’ decisions. Moreover, if the PUC has initiated a re-
view, squawking can be thought of as ﬁling canned testimony or haranguing witnesses,
while if the PUC has done nothing, the ﬁrm can squawk by supplying information to a
media eager for regulatory news.
In short, then, Propositions 1 and 2 directly predict that, even in periods of falling
input costs, PUCs will initiate few reviews and that such “minimal squawk” behaviour
should be more pronounced in states where regulators are appointed for shorter terms.
15Joskow (1974), pp. 299, Proposition 1.
153.2. Data
The above discussion suggests that the relevant dependent variable is the incidence of
formal rate reviews initiated by PUCs. Until 1990 the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) provided a brief summary of ongoing utility rate cases
in its annual reports. Although these yearbooks record the requests and outcomes of
rate cases by PUC and utility and, crucially, list the date ﬁled, they do not consistently
report consistently whether it was the PUC or the ﬁrm that initiated each rate case.
Consequently, our available dependent variable is the incidence of all formal rate reviews.
Our ﬁrst independent variable of interest is expected ﬁrm input costs. Detailed
microeconomic data on gas utilities is hard to obtain and thus we restrict attention to
the US electric industry. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) classiﬁes US electric
utilities as either major (or non-major) investor owned, publicly owned or a cooperative.
Since PUCs only have jurisdiction over the rates of investor-owned utilities, it is this
class that is relevant in a study of regulatory outcomes. Until 1996 the EIA published
an annual digest of ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial information, including a breakdown of each ﬁrm’s
total electric operating expenses together with a list of states served, sales and total
revenue. We therefore use these yearbooks to construct our expected input cost measure
- speciﬁcally lagged change in operating expenses (hereafter ∆opex)-f o rt h e1 6 2m a j o r
investor-owned electric utilities serving at least one state during our sample period.
Our second independent variable of interest is the statutory term of oﬃce for PUC
commissioners in the 48 states and District of Columbia served by at least one major
investor-owned utility.16 PUC term lengths are available from a variety sources. Since the
NARUC yearbooks report annually and provide the information for the other volumes,
our term length variables, together with all PUC controls, are taken from this source.
3.3. Hypotheses
Data limitations imply that our empirical framework must admit the possibility that
an observed review could have been initiated either by the PUC or the ﬁrm. However,
recall that we have assumed that the regulator can (eﬃciently) rely upon the ﬁrm to
initiate reviews when input costs are rising. Accordingly, career concerns should only
bite (and hence foster “minimal squawk” behaviour) when input costs are falling. In
light of this assumption, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest three hypotheses that we can take
to the available data:
Hypothesis 1. Formal reviews should be more likely the longer the term of oﬃce served
by commissioners (the marginal eﬀect of term length).
Hypothesis 2. Formal reviews should be more likely the higher ∆opex (the marginal
eﬀect of ∆opex).
Hypothesis 3. The eﬀect of term length should be greater when ∆opex is negative
rather than positive (the interaction eﬀect of ∆opex).
16Alaska is not recorded in the EIA yearbooks and Nebraska is not served by an investor-owned utility.
16From Proposition 2, irrespective of ∆opex, the longer term length, the higher the
probability reviews will be initiated, hence Hypothesis 1. Small drops (or rises) in ∆opex
eﬀectively signal that input costs are constant. Thus, from Proposition 1, irrespective
of term-length, the larger the drop in ∆opex the fewer reviews we should expect the
PUC to initiate. Recall that we have assumed that the regulator’s signal is positively
correlated with the true cost state. Thus, the larger the rise in ∆opex, the more reviews
we should expect ﬁrms to initiate. Hence Hypothesis 2. Finally, given regulators never
initiate reviews when ∆opex is positive, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the eﬀect of
term length should be greater conditional on a drop in ∆opex than a rise in ∆opex,
hence Hypothesis 3.
3.4. Estimation
A natural starting point is to ask whether these hypotheses are borne out in the raw
data. Section 4 therefore begins by reporting cross-tabulations of the number of reviews
by term length and ∆opex. To control for other factors likely to inﬂuence the incidence
of formal reviews, however, we also estimate a regression model.
One possibility is to estimate a Poisson (count data) model of the fraction of ﬁrms
serving state s with a rate case ﬁl e di ny e a rt. Such an approach has two shortcomings.
First, ﬁrms face very diﬀerent input cost conditions over the sample period and thus
a state-level cost index would fail to exploit this variation. Second, the relationships
between ﬁrms and PUCs may well be shaped by a variety of unobservable factors which
can only be controlled for by including individual ﬁrm-level eﬀects. In light of these
considerations we take a ﬁrm-level panel data approach.
Our dependent variable is a binary choice variable which takes the value 1 if a
review of ﬁrm is initiated in state s in year t and 0 otherwise. To identify both ﬁrm and
state ﬁxed eﬀects we would have to restrict attention to the 44 ﬁrms that serve more
than one state and hence discard over half of the available data. Instead, we include a
dummy for each of the 236 ﬁrm-state pairs in our sample and hence eﬀectively control
for the possibility that some regulatory relationships are more diﬃcult than others.17
Our dependent variable is therefore denoted by yit,w h e r ei denotes a ﬁrm-state pair,
i = 1,..,N =2 3 6and t = 1,...T where T ≤ 9 for some i.
As is standard in the case of discrete dependent variables, we posit the existence




0xit + uit (7)
where xit is a vector of k regressors and a constant α, β is a vector of k+1 coeﬃcients and
uit is an error term. Given our data set contains the entire population of major investor-
owned electric utilities, we assume individual eﬀects are ﬁxed across ﬁrms. Accordingly,
we assume uit = αi + υit, where αi is a constant and υit ∼ IID(0,σ2
υ). This underlying
17In Section 5 we conﬁrm that our results are robust to approach by dropping multi-state ﬁrms.
17variable y∗




it > 0 (υit > −αi − β
0xit)
0 if y∗
it ≤ 0 (υit ≤− αi − β
0xit)
and thus the probability that a ﬁrm faces a review is given by
Pr[yit = 1]=P r [ y
∗
it > 0] = Pr[υit > −αi − β
0xit]=F(αi + β
0xit), (8)
where F is some cumulative distribution function and the last equality holds as long as
F is symmetric around zero.
The Probit model is unsuitable for estimating models with ﬁxed eﬀects and thus
we restrict attention to the Logit model. When uit follows a Logistic distribution, (8) is
given by




1 +e x p ( αi + β
0xit)
(9)
But for the addition of N ﬁxed eﬀects (αi), this is a standard Logit model. Estimates
of the vector of coeﬃcients β in (9) can therefore be derived by maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) and are reported (for our variables of interest) in Table 3 below.
In any panel data model with ﬁxed eﬀects the number of parameters to be estimated
increases with N. Consequently, for large N and ﬁxed T, MLE produces inconsistent
estimates of αi. More worringly, under MLE, this results in inconsistent estimates of
β.18 This ‘incidental parameter problem’ can be resolved in a linear regression model
by performing the Within transformation. In a discrete choice model, however, this
transformation fails to remove the αi’s since β and αi are no longer asymptotically
independent. An alternative way to sweep away the αi’s from the model to be estimated,
suggested by Chamberlain (1980), is to maximise the likelihood function conditional on
PT
t=1yit (in our case to condition the likelihood for each set of Ti observations on the
number of reviews in this set). Given estimates from such a Conditional Logit model are
consistent they are also reported in Table 4.




it = α + αi + β1termit + β2∆opexit + β3Dit · termit +
β4t + γ
0zit + υit (10)
where α is a constant term and zit is a vector of PUC controls.19 From Hypotheses 1 and
2, β1 and β2 should be positive since they capture the marginal eﬀects of term-length
and ∆opex, respectively.20 Hypotheses 3 suggests that the coeﬃcient on the interaction
18For a simple illustration of how the inconsistency of MLE of αi is transmitted into inconistency of
b βMLE see Hsiao (1986).
19Deﬁnitions of all variables are given in the appendix.
20Of course, since Pr[yit =1 ]is a non-linear function of xit, the estimated coeﬃcients reported in
Tables 3 and 4 do not have a straight forward interpretation as marginal eﬀects.
18term Dit·termit, β3, should be positive since longer terms should exert a greater positive
eﬀect on the probability of a review when costs are falling (Dit = 1) than when costs are
rising (Dit =0 ).
The model given in (10) controls for unobservable heterogeneity via the inclusion
of ﬁrm-state ﬁxed eﬀects αi and for the fact that both the number of reviews and term-
length follow a downward trend during our sample period via the inclusion of a simple
time trend t. Besides term length, PUCs vary in a number of other ways that might
plausibly be expected to aﬀect the probability of review.21 Given our aim is to test
Hypotheses 1-3, these institutional variables are ‘nuisance parameters’ and hence we
include the vector zit simply to isolate the role played by ∆opexit,t e r m it and Dit·termit.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Incidence of Rate Reviews
We ﬁrst ask whether the theoretical predictions detailed above are borne out in the raw
data. Table 2 reports cross-tabulations of the number of reviews by ∆opexit and termst.
Table 2: Formal Rate Reviews of Major US Investor-owned Electric Utilities








































Cutting the data in this way oﬀers broad support in favour of the “minimal squawk”
model. First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the percentage of ﬁrms-state pairs facing a
review in any given year is lower in states where the statutory term of oﬃce is strictly
less than the sample mean of 6 years (25.3% relative to 30.7%). Second, consistent with
Hypothesis 2, the percentage of ﬁrms-state pairs facing a review in any given year is
lower when input costs have been falling, and hence cost expectations are low, (23.2%
21To cite just two, if fuel costs can be passed through automatically one would expect both ﬁrms and
PUCs to initiate fewer reviews. While if a PUC has more staﬀ relative to the size of its population one
m i g h te x p e c ti tt ob eb e t t e rp l a c e dt oi n i t i a t em o r er e v i e w s .
19relative to 30.4%). Finally, consistent with Hypothesis 3, the eﬀect of term length on
the incidence of reviews is greater when input costs are falling. Speciﬁcally, while 18.5%
of ﬁrm-state pairs with falling inputs costs and short terms face a review in any given
year, 26% of ﬁrms-state pairs with falling input costs face a review when terms are long -
an increase of 40.5%. In contrast, when input cost are rising, moving from short to long
terms only increases the fraction of ﬁrms facing a review by 16% (i.e. 27.4% to 31.8%).
Of course, there are many other factors which should be controlled for when testing
the “minimal squawk” hypotheses and thus we now report the results of the Logit model
g i v e ni n( 9 ) .
Table 3: Logit Estimation of the Probability of Formal Review22





































PUC Contols No Ye s No Ye s
FixedEﬀects No No Ye s Ye s
Log L -1119.225 -1052.828 -871.036 -832.985
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.096 0.199 0.208
No. of pairs 236 236 194 193
Observations 1998 1942 1701 1646
All regressions include a constant and use robust standard errors; absolute value of z statistics
in parentheses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Regression (i) reports b β1- b β3 in the absence of PUC controls and ﬁrm-state ﬁxed
eﬀects. Simply controlling for a time trend does little to alter the story from the raw data.
termit and ∆opexit are positive and signiﬁcant at 5% respectively, while Dit · termit is
positive, although not signiﬁcant at conventional inference levels. Note that introducing
the vector of PUC controls zit (Regression (ii)) renders termit insigniﬁcant.
22All regressions were repeated using alternative cost measures from the EIA’s breakdown of operating
expenses (speciﬁcally operation and maintenance, power and fuel costs). In each case, ∆opex explained
more of the variation in the probability of review. Similarly, using real ∆opex (∆opex deﬂated by the
US GDP deﬂator in 1996 chained dollars) left the coeﬃcients on all variables of interest unchanged.
20However, these results are overturned if we exploit the unique feature of our data
set, namely our ability to allow for unobservable ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Regression
(iii) reports b β1-b β3 with ﬁrm-state dummies but without PUC controls. The signiﬁcance
of ∆opexit drops markedly, while termit is once again signiﬁcant at the 5% level and
Dit · termit is insigniﬁcant at standard levels but retains the correct sign. If we then re-
introduce PUC controls (Regression (iv)), termit remains signiﬁcant at 5% while ∆opexit
and Dit · termit remain insigniﬁcant but retain the correct signs.
We interpret these results as follows. Consistent with our theory, ﬁrms are more
likely to face a formal review the longer the term of oﬃce served by their regulators
and the greater the lagged rise in their input costs. The fact that the latter eﬀect is
insigniﬁcant following the introduction of ﬁrm level eﬀects is unsurprising given ∆opexit
is, itself, highly ﬁrm idiosyncratic. Moreover, we also ﬁnd weak evidence of an interaction
eﬀect between our proxies for career concerns and cost signals. That this interaction eﬀect
is insigniﬁc a n t ,i na d d i t i o nt ot h el e v e le ﬀects, is also unsurprising given the relative small
size of our sample.
As mentioned above, however, for large N and ﬁxed T MLE of the Logit model
given in (9) yields inconsistent estimates of the vector of coeﬃcients β. Thus we now
report the results of the Conditional (Fixed Eﬀects) Logit model.











































PUC Controls No Ye s Ye s Ye s
Log L -649.544 -705.870 -315.881 -526.127
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.107 0.138 0.133
No. of pairs 194 193 97 166
Observations 1701 1646 847 1441
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10%
levels respectively.
21Regressions (iii) and (iv) in Table 4 show that the (qualitative) results reported
in Table 3 are robust to conditioning on the total number of reviews. termit is positive
as predicted and drops in signiﬁcance following the introduction of PUC controls, while
∆opexit and Dit · termit are positive as predicted but insigniﬁcant at standard levels.
Table 4 also conﬁrms that our results are not driven by our decision to use ﬁrm-
state eﬀects rather than ﬁrm dummies to control for unobservable heterogeneity. That
is, repeating Regression (iv) for the subset of single-state ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms for which the
two ﬁxed eﬀects coincide) we obtain similar results. We also repeat Regression (iv) for
the subset of appointing states. Again we obtain similar results, suggesting Hilton (1972)
was indeed correct to conjecture that appointed regulators engage in “minimal squawk”
behaviour.
4.2. Prices
An obvious extension to the above test is to ask whether a PUC’s unwillingness to initiate
reviews in the face of career concerns feeds through into higher average revenue. That is,
do ﬁrms regulated by commissioners with shorter terms of oﬃce charge higher prices?23
The EIA yearbooks list sales and revenue by head-oﬃce state and thus we do not have
a breakdown of prices in each state served. To control for the possibility that PUC
institutions in other states aﬀect this measure of average revenue we therefore restrict
attention to the 109 ﬁrms that serve customers in their ‘head-oﬃce’, but no other, state.
We assume that prices are determined by three groups of variables: PUC institu-
tions, supply-side factors and demand-side factors. Speciﬁcally, we posit the existence
of the following linear model






zit + υit, (11)
where deﬁnitions of the elements of the vectors sit, dit and zit, are given in the appendix.
Hypothesis 1 (the marginal eﬀect of term-length) suggests that the coeﬃcient β1 should
be negative. That is, the longer their term of oﬃce, the more likely PUC commissioners
are to initiate a review to reduce the allowable rate level which should be reﬂected in
the rate structure as lower prices.
The model given in (11) maintains the assumption that ﬁrm eﬀects are ﬁxed but
also introduces a year eﬀect to control for inﬂation and year speciﬁcs h o c k s .T h ee r r o r
term uit is therefore decomposed into two constants, αi and αt, in addition to the random
variable υit ∼ IID(0,συ). On the supply-side we include avopexit as a proxy for per unit
costs, landit to reﬂect possible scale (dis-) economies associated with serving larger states
and census region dummies to isolate geographic factors such as terrain or climate. We
also include stpopit and stdpcyit to control for inter and intra-state variation in the
demand for electricity.
As in (9) above, the number of parameters to be estimated in (11) increases with
N. In contrast to MLE of (9), however, performing ordinary least squares (OLS) on (11)
23T h er a t es t r u c t u r e ss e tb yﬁrms often allow for quantity discounts and thus calculating prices from
revenue and sales may not always reﬂect the price per kwh paid by all customers.
22yields estimates of β that are eﬃcient and consistent, even for ﬁxed T. Thus Table 5
below reports OLS estimates of β1 from the model given in (11).
Table 5: Least Squares (Fixed Eﬀects) Residential Price Regressions24










PUC Controls No Ye s No Ye s
Fixed Eﬀects No No Ye s Ye s
F(k, n− k − 1) 107.57 86.01 271.01 286.98
R2 0.727 0.747 0.939 0.941
No. of pairs 109 109 109 109
Observations 952 931 952 931
All regressions include a constant, αt, sit and dit and use robust standard errors.
Absolute t statistics in parentheses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Regression (i) reports b β1 in the presence of supply and demand controls. Prior
to controlling for variation in PUC institutions and ﬁrm-state eﬀects, termit displays
the correct sign but is highly insigniﬁcant. Introducing the vector of PUC controls
(Regression (ii)), reduces the signiﬁcance of termit. Again, ﬁxed eﬀects overturn these
results: in Regressions (iii) and (iv) termit is negative and signiﬁcant at 5%. Our
results therefore suggest that ﬁrms do indeed charge higher prices when regulated by
commissioners serving shorter terms.
4.3. Discussion
The above results clearly support the predictions of our theoretical model. As this section
brieﬂyh i g h l i g h t s ,o u rﬁrm-level approach also oﬀers some more general insights into the
determinants of regulatory outcomes.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects play a pivotal role. It is possible to test for
the presence of such heterogeneity (i.e. αi 6= α) in our rate regressions via a Likelihood
Ratio test. With Regression (iii) in Table 3 as the unrestricted model and Regression (i)
the restricted model χ2(192) = 264.80 (p =0 .0004). Similarly, with Regression (iv) as
the unrestricted model and Regression (ii) the restricted model (i.e. with PUC controls),
χ2(191)=2 3 4 .58 (p =0 .0173).25 These critical values are signiﬁcant at 5%, allowing
us to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity. Similarly, joint signiﬁcance tests on the
24Regressions (i)-(iv) were repeated using commercial and industrial prices (the two remaining sectors
of note). In every case the coeﬃcient on termit was negative, as predicted, but was insigniﬁcant at
standard levels.
25In both cases the restricted regressions were run for the estimation sub-sample from the unrestricted
regression to maintain parity in sample sizes.
23ﬁxed eﬀects in the price regressions yields strongly signiﬁcant F-statistics of 72.23 and
54.80, for Regressions (iii) and (iv) respectively.
These ﬁndings suggest that unobservable ﬁrm-level factors are important determi-
nants of regulatory outcomes. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that previous state-level
panel data studies such as Besley and Coate (2001), who focus on prices or Navarro
(1982), who focuses on regulatory climate, have concluded that term length is not im-
portant. Indeed, we ﬁnd that term length exerts a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
probability of rate review and a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on prices only in the presence
ﬁrm-state dummies.
Our results also suggest that previous papers may have over-stated the importance
of other PUC institutions such as the method of commissioner selection. For instance,
taking a cross-sectional approach, Crain and McCormick (1984), Primeaux and Mann
(1986) and Smart (1994) ﬁnd weak evidence that consumers in electing states face lower
utility prices. While, allowing for state eﬀects, Besley and Coate (2001) ﬁnd strong
evidence of such an eﬀect. In contrast, as Table A3 in the appendix shows, once we
control for ﬁrm-level eﬀects, there is little evidence that selection methods matter.
Focusing on PUC institutions more generally, a Likelihood Ratio test on zit using
Regressions (i) and (ii) in Table 3 yields χ2(11)=4 6 .84 (p =0 ), implying these controls
are jointly signiﬁcant. However, such a test using Regressions (iii) and (iv) yields a
χ2(11) statistic of 13.21 (p =0 .2801), suggesting ﬁrm eﬀects render these controls jointly
insigniﬁcant. Similarly, a test of joint signiﬁcance on zit in Regression (ii) in Table 5
yields an F-statistics of 4.19,w h i c hi ss i g n i ﬁcant at 1% but such a test using Regression
(iii) yields an F-statistics of 1.14 which is insigniﬁcant at standard levels. As Table A3
highlights, in addition to select, the variables that are rendered insigniﬁcant in the price
regressions are aam, test, valst,a n dqual. One possible conclusion, then, is that these
institutions evolve in response to the type of ﬁrms regulated. For example, faced by a
particularly obstreperous ﬁrm, a PUC may require better qualiﬁed commissioners.
5. Conclusion
Governments are appointing their regulators on short ﬁxed term contracts, often in re-
sponse to fears that long contracts facilitate collusion between regulators and regulatees.
Yet Hilton (1972) suggested that regulators appointed on ﬁnite contracts would pacify
ﬁrms to maintain favourable reputations. Accordingly, this paper revisits Hilton’s “min-
imal squawk” conjecture to ask if such a policy stance might actually be replacing one
source of political failure with another.
We show that if the job market cannot observe the quality of regulatory decisions,
career concerns are irrelevant, leaving regulators free to follow any ex ante desire to
make good decisions. While if the market observes the quality of every decision, career
concerns encourage good decision-making, since bad decisions act as evidence of low
ability. Regulated ﬁrms therefore have an incentive to reveal the quality of unfavourable
decisions. This is not in the hope of having regulatory decisions overturned, but rather
because this ensures less able regulators set favourable policies more often to ensure the
24ﬁrm stays silent and their professional reputation remains intact.
Given statutory terms of oﬃce are a natural exogenous indicator of the strength
of regulatory career concerns, we test this hypothesis by exploiting variation in term-
length across state PUCs. We ﬁnd strong evidence in favour of our theoretical model.
In particular, controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms are less likely to
face a rate review and also earn more per kwh from residential customer, the shorter the
term of oﬃce served by their regulators.
Our results suggest short terms of oﬃce may not be the panacea that some have
hoped for. Rather, governments may need to strike a balance between alternative sources
of regulatory capture, appointing their regulators - and arguably bureaucrats in general
- on longer, if not permanent contracts. In concluding, however, we note that it may be
possible to limit this trade oﬀ. Our comparative statics results suggest that the extent
to which career concerns result in sub-optimal decision-making may be limited by a) the
regulator’s ex ante desire to make a good decision and b) an increase in the ability of the
least able regulators and/or a decrease in the ability of the most able. While we leave
a formal analysis to future research, this suggests that shorter terms of oﬃce might be
desirable if accompanied by explicit incentive schemes or by changes in the composition
of the regulatory pool.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .D i ﬀerentiating (5) wrt to pi and qi yields
∂E[Ui]































=( θS − θD)Hr > 0. (A3)
(a) Existence. Suppose µ(t)=µ(g)=
1
2. Since (θi −
1
2)Hr > 0 ∀i, (A1) is strictly
positive and (A2) is strictly negative ∀i = S,D. It therefore follows that (5) has a unique
solution characterised by σo
i =( 1,0) ∀i.G i v e nσo
i =( 1,0) ∀i, (3) and (4) imply that the
market’s beliefs are indeed as stated and hence that such an equilibrium exists.
(b) Uniqueness. Suppose that µ(t) >µ (g). From (3) and (4) we require e pS + e qS >
e pD + e qD. Given these beliefs, (A1) is strictly positive, implying po
i = 1 ∀i = S,D. While







a contradiction. Analogous reasoning rules out µ(t) <µ (g). Alternatively, suppose
µ(t)=µ(g). If these beliefs have been derived from Bayes’ Rule, (3) and (4) imply that
e pS = e pD, e qS = e qD and 2 > e pS+e qS > 0. Moreover µ(t)=µ(g)=1
2. Recall that the market
i sa s s u m e dt or e t a i ni t sp r i o rb e l i e fPr(θS)=1
2 at information sets oﬀ the equilibrium
path. Thus µ(t)=µ(g)=
1
2 for any e pS = e pD, e qS = e qD. However we know from part (a)
that, given these beliefs, σo
i =( 1,0) ∀i = S,D is the unique solution to (5).










2 (1 − qi − (pi − qi)θi)µ(l,g)
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∂qj =( θi + θj − 1)Hr + δ
h
1
2(θi + θj − 1)(µ(h,g) − µ(l,g))
i
(A7)









=( θS − θD)Hr + δ
h
1
2(θS − θD)(µ(h,g) − µ(l,g))
i
.
Moreover, application of Bayes’s rule yields
µ(l,g)=
1 − e qS − (e pS − e qS)θS




1 − e pS +(e pS − e qS)θS
2 − e pS − e qD +(e pS − e qS)θS +(e pD − e qD)θD
. (A10)









and δ ≤ δf, where
δf =
2(2θD − 1)Hr(2 − θS − θD)(θS + θD)
(θS − θD)2 .
Substituting for (A11) in (A5) yields,
∂E[US]
∂pS =( θS − 1
2)Hr + δ
"
(θS − θD)(3θS + θD − 2)





∂pD =( θD − 1
2)Hr + δ
"
(θS − θD)(θS +3 θD − 2)
4(2 − θS − θD)(θS + θD)
#
> 0.




2 − θS)Hr − δ
"
(θS − θD)2







2 − θD)Hr + δ
"
(θS − θD)2
4(2− θS − θD)(θS + θD)
#
which may be positive or negative depending on δ.
28Given δ ≤ δf, it follows that σo
i =( 1,0) is a solution to (A4) ∀ i = S,D. From (3),
(A9) and (A10) the market’s beliefs are indeed as stated and hence such an equilibrium
exists.







(1 − θS)+( 1 − e qD)(1 − θD)
and µ(h,g)=
θS
θS +( 1 − e qD)θD
, (A12)
for some e qD ∈ (0, e qD) and δ > δf, where e qD solves
µ(t)=θDµ(h,g)+( 1 − θD)µ(l,g).
Note that (A11) and (A12) are equivalent if e qD =0 . Thus, given δ > δf, it follows
from part (a) that when e qD =0(A6) is strictly positive for i = D. In contrast,
∂E[UD]
∂qD |e qD=1=( 1






It is easy to show that
∂2E[UD]
∂qD∂e qD < 0,
(i.e. D’s incentive to choose t following s = h decreases the more likely the market thinks
she is to play ‘always tough’). Thus there must exist a unique value of e qD ∈ (0, e qD),
e q∗





D = e qD.
It now remains to verify that, at e q∗
D, (A5) is strictly positive ∀i (supporting po
i = 1
∀i = S,D) and (A6) is strictly negative for i = S (supporting qo
S =0 ) . From (A10)
µ(h,g) − µ(l,g)=
(1 − e qD)(θS − θD)
(θS +( 1 − e qD)θD)(1 − θS +( 1 − e qD)(1 − θD))
is strictly positive for any e qD ∈ [0,1). Thus for i = S,D, j = D (A6) is strictly positive
for any e q∗
D. Likewise for (A7).
Given the deﬁnition of e q∗
D, it therefore follows that po
S = 1,q o
S =0is a solution to
(A4) for i = S and po
D = 1,q o
D = e q∗
D is a solution to (A4) for i = D. From (3), (A9) and
(A10) the market’s beliefs are indeed as stated and hence such an equilibrium exists.
The ‘contradict, always tough’ hybrid sub-game equilibrium can be proved in a similar
manner.
Establishing uniqueness is possible along similar, if more long-winded, lines to
Lemma 1. (Full details are available upon request).
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .This is exactly analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.









2 (qi +( pi − qi)θi)µ(l,t)+
1
2 (pi − (pi − qi)θi)µ(h,t)+
1
2 (1 − qi − (pi − qi)θi)µ(l,g)+
1
2 (1 − pi +( pi − qi)θi)µ(h,g)
#
. (A13)
Diﬀerentiating (A13) wrt to pi and qi yields
∂E[Ui]


























Note µ(l,g) and µ(h,g) are given by (A9) and (A10), while application of Bayes’s rule
yields
µ(l,t)=
e qS +(e pS − e qS)θS




e pS − (e pS − e qS)θS
e pS − (e pS − e qS)θS + e pD − (e pD − e qD)θD
. (A17)







2 − θS − θD
. (A18)
Substituting for (A18) in (A14) yields
∂E[Ui]




(2θi − 1)(θS − θD)
2(2− θS − θD)(θS + θD)
#
> 0 ∀i.
Similarly substituting for (A18) in (A15) yields
∂E[Ui]
∂qi =( 1
2 − θi)Hr − δ
"
(2θi − 1)(θS − θD)
2(2 − θS − θD)(θS + θD)
#
< 0 ∀i.
It therefore follows that, for any δ, σo
i =( 1,0) is a solution to (A13). From (A9),
(A10), (A16) and (A17) the market’s beliefs are indeed as stated and hence such an
equilibrium exists. Note existence of the ‘contradict’ pooling equilibrium can proved in
a similar manner, while establishing uniqueness is again possible along the lines given in
the proof of Lemma1.
30Proof of Proposition 2. Let the function δmix p(θS,θD,H r, e pD) denote the values of
δ such that D is willing to mix on s = l, given e pS = 1 and e qi =0∀i. Note δf =
δmix p(θS,θD,H r,1), implying δf gives the value of δ beyond which D mixes on s = l.
Part (i). This follows immediately from Lemma 3; S has no career concern incentive
to deviate from setting t when s = l for any e pD.
Part (ii).F r o ma b o v e ,f o rD to mix on s = l, we require
∂E[UD]










Z(θS,θD, e pD)=µ(g) − θDµ(l,t) − (1 − θD)µ(h,t).
Substituting for the market’s beliefs when e σS =( 1,0) and e σD =(e pD,0)) yields
Z =
1
(3 − e pD)
−
(1 − θS)(1 − θD)
(1 − θS − e pD(1 − θD))
−
θSθD
(θS + e pDθD)
.
Diﬀerentiating Z wrt to e pD gives
∂Z
∂ e pD =
1
(3 − e pD)2 +
(1 − θS)(1 − θD)2
(1 − θS − e pD(1 − θD))2 +
θSθD
2
(θS + e pDθD)2 > 0.




implying δmix p must be decreasing in e pD. Thus e pD - and hence the probability that the
unable regulator plays ‘follow’ - decreases as δ increases.
Part (iii).L e t e p
D solve µ(g)=θDµ(l,t)+( 1 − θD)µ(h,t))w h e ne σS =( 1,0) and
e σD =( e pD,0).I tt h e nf o l l o w st h a tZ must be strictly positive for any e pD ∈ ( e p
D,1] and
hence that δmix p is increasing in Hr as stated.
Diﬀerentiating Z wrt to θS yields, after some re-arrangement,
∂Z
∂θ S =
e pD(θS − θD)(θS + θD − 2θSθD +2e pD(1 − θD)θD)
(θS + e pDθD)2((1 − θS + e pD(1 − θD))2
which by inspection is strictly positive for any e pD ∈ (0,1]. Thus δmix p must be decreasing
in θS.
Diﬀerentiating Z wrt to θD yields, after some re-arrangement,
∂Z
∂θD =
e pD(θS − θD)(e pD(2θSθD − θS − θD) − 2(1 − θS)θS)
(θS + e pDθD)2((1 − θS + e pD(1 − θD))2
which by inspection is strictly negative for any e pD ∈ (0,1]. Thus, given the deﬁnition of
δmix p, it follows that δmix p is increasing in θD.
312. Data
Table A1: Deﬁnition of Variables used in Rate Review Regressions
Variable Description
αi Firm-state ﬁxed eﬀect; i = 1,...,236
termit Term of oﬃce of PUC commissioners (years)
opexit Firm i total electric operating expenses (000$)
∆opexit opexit−1 − opexit−2
Dit 1i f∆opexit < 0; 0i fo t h e r w i s e
t Time trend; t = 1,..,9
zit PUC Controls
selectit 1 if commissioners are appointed; 0 if elected
aamit 1 if automatic adjustment mechanism for fuel costs; 0 if otherwise
test1it 1 if historic test year; 0 if otherwise
test2it 1 if full forecast; 0 if otherwise
test3it 1 if combination of historic and future test years; 0 if otherwise
valstit 1 if valuation standards are pure original cost; 0 if otherwise
staﬀpcit Total commission staﬀ per 10,000 state population.
numcomit Number of commissioners
stagit 1 if commissioner’s terms are staggered; 0 if concurrent
minrepit 1 if minority party representation by law or practice; 0 if otherwise
qualit 1i fs p e c i ﬁcq u a l i ﬁcations required by statute; 0 if otherwise
postocit 1 if time restrictions on industry employment; 0 if otherwise
ntregit Number of regulated energy utilities
Table A2: Deﬁnition of Variables used in Price Regressions
Variable Description
pit
Electric operating revenue /
sales to residential customers (cents per kwh)
αt Year eﬀect; t = 1,...,9
sit Supply Controls
avopexit opexit / total sales to customers (cents per kwh)
landit State land area (square miles)
rg1i − rg9i Census region dummies
dit Demand Controls
stpopit State population
stdpcyit State disposable per capita income ($)
All PUC variables were obtained from Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Reg-
ulation of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,( K .B a u e r
ed.), Washington: NARUC (1982-1990), except for staﬀpcit which, along with landit,
was taken from The Book of the States, (Council of State Governments), Washington
32(1982/3-1990/1). All ﬁrm variables were taken from the EIA yearbooks (DOE/EIA-
0437), published under a number of titles, most recently “Financial Statistics of Major
US Investor Owned Electric Utilities” until the series was discontinued in 1996. For more
details see http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/invest/invest_sum.html. Finally,
the state variables stpopit and stdpcyit were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis Regional Accounts Data available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi.
3. Further Regression Estimates












































































































































Absolute value of z and t-stats in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
1selectit does not vary within-group during our sample period and therefore cannot be identiﬁed
in a Conditional Logit regression.
33